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NOTES
allow the plaintiff-correspondence school, as damages, the contract
price less the amount which it saves by virtue of not having to perform
the remainder of the contract;4 but places the burden of proving these
"cost savings" on the defendant-student.5 The third rule is the "Ma'ss-
achusettts rule" which allows plaintiff to recover the entire contract
price in all cases 6 on the theory that defendant's promise is an "in-
dependant covenant." 7
A closer examination of the "Nebraska rule" discloses that it will
result in recovery of the full contract price-the "Massachusetts rule"
-in nearly every case. Damages in these cases are always difficult
to prove. Showing the proportion of the company's considerable over-
head expenses to be borne by this contract, proving the variable ex-
penses incurred on the contract in issue up to the time of the breach,
plus showing the reasonable profit on the contract, would be a difficult
evidentiary problem, even to one having access to the correspondence
school's records. But the normal defendant would have no knowledge
of any of the school's records and to him, getting the records to the
court in which the action is brought may be just as serious a problem
as their interpretation. Fbr the defendant's attorney, often in a different
state from that where the records of the company are located, the job
is, as a practical matter, impossible,8 since the amount of money which
he can save the defendant is small compared with the costs of litigation.
The failure in proof will result in no "cost savings" being shown and
recovery of the full contract price by the plaintiff.9
'The amount of damages theoretically recoverable by the plaintiff is the
same under both the Nebraska and Michigan rules. Suppose a case wehere the
contract price is $100, expenses incurred up to the time of breach $50, and ex-
penses not incurred because of the breach $30, leaving a profit of $20. Under
the "Michigan rule," plaintiff should recover past expenses, $50, plus expected
profits, $20, totaling $70. Under the "Nebraska rule," plaintiff should recover
the contract price, $100, less expenses not incurred because of the breach, $30,
also totaling $70. It bears repeating, however, that this is only the theoretical
measure of recovery under the two rules, the evidentiary problems of neither
party being considered.
'5 Int'l Text-Book Co. v. Martin, 92 Neb. 430, 138 N.W. 582 (1912); Int'l
Text-Book Co. v. Martin, 82 Neb. 403, 117 N.W. 994 (1908); Int'l Correspondence
School v. Crabtree, 162 Tenn. 70, 34 S.W.2d 447 K1931).
6 Int'l Text-Book Co. v. Martin, 221 Mass. 1, 108 N.E. 469 (1915); Sackman
v. Stephenson, 11 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Int'l Text-Book Co. v. Lynch,
86 Vt. 215, 84 Atl. 814 (1912).
74 Corbin, Contracts § 983, p. 947 (1951) (An independent covenant is one
that is ". . . not conditioned on performance of an agreed exchange promise in
return .... "). It would seem that the promise of the student to pay money
would obviously be dependent upon the promise of the school to furnish lessons
under the contract. Professor Corbin agrees with this view in the section
cited above defining independent promises.
8 See Int'l Text-Book Co. v. Martin, 92 Neb. 430, 138 N.W. 582 (1912), for
an example of an unsuccessful attempt by a defendant, through the testimony
of expert witnesses, to show these cost savings.
9 See criticism of "Massachusetts rule," supra note 7.
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The purpose of this comment is to put the "Nebraska rule" to a
critical test to see if the past decisions seem justified in shifting to the
defendant in the correspondence school cases the task of proving plain-
tiff's cost saving.
There are three arguments generally made in justification of Ne-
braska's rule.'0 The basic reason for the rule is that because of the near
impossibility of proving damages, there will probably be a failure of
proof; and rather than have any loss resulting from this fall on an
"innocent" plaintiff, it should fall on the defandant "wrongdoer." "
The cases, however, contaijn only indirect hints of such an analysis on
the part of the courts. However, failure of proof on the issue of dam-
ages is something which has often plagued plaintiffs in actions upon
contracts, yet the courts have not generally shifted the burden of proof
for this reason. 12 In all such cases the breaching party is no less a
"wrongdoer" 13 than here. In a field of the law characterized by proof
of damage problems very similar to those faced here-the law con-
cerning building contracts 4 -the burden is still placed on the plain-
tiff to prove the elements of his damages as in the normal contract
action. 15
A second argument sometimes made by the courts is that the addi-
tion or loss of one student, when the plaintiff has perhaps hundreds
of such contracts, would hardly increase or diminish plaintiff's ex-
penses to any perceptible degree. 16 This argument is, however, basically
invalid because it is not necessarily empirically true. When compared
to plaintiff's over-all costs of performing all of its contracts, it is true
that the savings on one contract may be negligible, but the important
factor is found by comparing the cost of completing this one contract
11 The reason for the Nebraska Supreme Court's decisions in the two Martin
cases, supra note 5, are not as clear as they might be. Few reasons were given
in the opinion, and the Court did not indicate which, if any, it felt were the
most important.
11 Note, 34 Iowa L. Rev. 103 (1948).
"United States v. Behan, 110 U.S. 338 (1884); Wittenburg v. Mollyneaux, 55
Neb. 429, 75 N.W. 835 (1898); Allen, Heaton & McDonald v. Castle Farm Amuse-
ment Co., 151 Ohio St. 522, 86 N.E.2d 782 (1949); McCormick, Damages § 142
(1935).
1 "Wrongdoer" seems a harsh term for one who merely breaches'a contract.
The term has connotations of one guilty of a breach of a moral duty, or duty to
society, rather than a mere contractual duty.
" In both types of contracts, the plaintiff will have fairly large fixed over-
head expenses which Will need to be apportioned among several contracts other
than the one on which action is brought. Both are characterized by having cer-
tain variable expenses attributable to the one contract. Also, in both, the
evidence to prove expenses and profits must be gleaned from voluminous
records.
' Supra note 1.
"Int'l Text-Book Co. v. Martin, 82 Neb. 403, 117 N.W. 994 (1908); Note, 34
Iowa L. Rev. (1948). But see Air Cond. Training Co. v. Knouse, 46 So.2d 665
(La. App. 1950).
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with the total costs on that contract, where the savings may very well
be substantial. The sum of the cost savings on all of a schoors contracts
which have been breached may also be a considerable amount. It
would seem, however, that to the Nebraska Supreme Court, the fact
that the cost savings will in no case be very substantial might be held
to be so obvious as to be a matter for judicial notice. This was a basis
of the Nebraska Court's decision in case,17 even though the Court stated
there was no evidence before it concerning the amount of the savings.
But it does not appear to be a fact so notorious to the reasonable man
that the production of evidence would be unnecessary,", and a case
involving substantial savings has actually arisen. What the Nebraska
Court would do were it faced with a case where the cost savings were
actually shown to be substantial, 9 and no evidence were introduced as
to the amount, is a matter for conjecture. That such a case has arisen
positively refutes this argument as one generally upholding the "Ne-
braska rule." 20
There is some indication that the "Nebraska rule" places the burden
on the defandant to show cost savings on the theory that this is an ele-
ment in mitigation of damages to be pleaded and proved by the de-
fendant.21 No court which has applied the rule has expressly based its
decision on this argument.22 This argument begs the question, however,
since the main issue is which party should bear the burden of proof, and
the mere act of categorizing cost savings as an element in mitigation of
damages does not rest the decision on a logically sound basis.
'
7 Intl Text-Book Co. v. Martin, 82 Neb. 403, 117 N.W. 994 (1908).
1t is submitted that in the two Martin cases, supra note 5, the Nebraska
Supreme court did not intend to take judicial notice of the fact that "cost sav-
ings" will in every case be negligible. The Court may not have viewed its acts
in this light. It is possible that, were it pointed out that this was the practical
effect of its decision, the Court might be influenced to change the position taken
by Nebraska on the burden of proof problem.
11 As they were shown to be in Air Cond. Training- Co. v. Knouse, 46 So.2d
665 (La. App. 1950).
10 The Court of Appeals of Louisiana was faced with that problem in Air
Cond. Training Co. v. Knouse, 46 So.2d 665 (La. App. 1950). Previous to this
case, the Court had held that cost savings to the plaintiff-correspondence school
were negligible, and the Court allowed recovery of the full contract price. See
LaSalle Extension University-v. Thibodeaux, 155 So. 53 (La. App. 1934). In
that case evidence was introduced to that effect by the plaintiff. In the Knouse
case, however, the Court recognized the fact that cost savings were consider-
able, and refused to allow recovery of the full contract price to the plaintiff.
" Int'l Text-Book Co. v. Martin, 82 Neb. 403, 117 N.W. 994 (1908); Int'l
Correspondence School v. Crabtree, 162 Tenn. 70, 34 S.W.2d 447 (1931).
" Nothing was said of the mitigation theory in either of the two cases cited
supra note 21, except that the Tennessee Court, without explaining its sig-
nificance to the decision in question, quoted from a mitigation of damages case
during one phase of its argument. The Nebraska Court merely cited one former
Nebraska case concerning the burden of proof on elements tending to mitigate
a plaintiff's damages.
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Thus it can be seen that each of the arguments 23 posed by pro-
ponents of the "Nebraska rule" has its equally plausible counter- argu-
ment. However, there are other rules from the law of contracts and
evidence that seem to swing the balance against the "Nebraska rule"
and weaken the position of those jurisdictions following it.
(a) Where the facts necessary to prove a given issue are primarily
within the knowledge of one party, that party will generally have the
burden of proof on the issue.24 This rule is followed in Nebraska to the
point of actually shifting the burden of proof from one party to the
other for this reason alone.25 Here the correspondence school has all
the records necessary to compute the amount of its costs and expected
profits, and has in its employ the personnel to interpret this evidence.2 6
Under this theory, therefore, the burden of proving the measure of
damages would seem better placed on the plaintiff.
(b) Most jurisdictions, Nebraska included, allow either party to a
contract to stop performance of the contract by the other party and
have his damages assessed as of that time.2 7 The other party is not
then allowed to increase the breaching party's damages by continuing
to perform his part of the contract.28 A rule which allows recovery of
the full contract price by the plaintiff, regardless of the stage of per-
formance at which he was asked to stop, would seem to be in direct
- An additional theory upon which the Nebraska Court might have relied
in its decision in the Martin cases is that the contract was an "entirety," in
which case the burden would be on the defendant to prove plaintiff's cost sav-
ings. Professor Williston has criticized this theory, see 5 Williston, Contracts §
1352 (Rev. ed. 1937), pointing out that it can have application only in the case
where the student has paid his money, then breached the contract, and brings
action for the return of his payments.
-"' Fitzsimmons v. Gilmore, 134 Neb. 200, 278 N.W. 262 (1938); Allen, Heaton
& McDonald v. Castle Farm Amusement Co., 151 Ohio St. 522, 86 N.E.2d 782
(1949); Refrigeration & Air Cond. Inst. v. Rine, 80 Ohio App. 317, 75 N.E.2d 473
(1946); Stoddard v. Illinois Improv't & Ballast Co., 275 Ill. 199, 113 N.E. 913
(1916); 3 Corbin, Contracts § 749 (1951).
- Fitzsimmons v. Gilmore, 134 Neb. 200, 278 N.W. 262 (1938).
- The Nebraska deposition and discovery rules, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1267.01
to 25-1267.44 (Cum. Supp. 1951), provide a method by which defendant's at-
torney could obtain this information from the plaintiff. As pointed out, how-
ever, this process is too costly compared with the amount saved to the de-
fendant to be of any practical use in these cases.
27 Hale v. Hess, 30 Neb. 42, 46 N.W. 261 (1890); Rockingham County v. Luten
Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929); Int'l Text-Book Co. v. Jones, 166 Mich.
86, 131 N.W. 98 (1911); 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1038 (1951).
- The equity of this rule can easily be illustrated by the case where the
contract calls for payment of many thousands of dollars. The party who has
contracted to pay the money may be able to get out of paying thousands of
dollars-representing expenses which the plaintiff does not have to incur-by
breaching the contract and paying his damages at that time. Where a party
knows he will not be able to meet the total contract price, this is a very valuable
right. To hold as the Massachusetts and Nebraska rules do amounts to giving
specific performance of the contract in every case. See Gardner, An Inquiry
Into The Principles Of The Law of Contracts, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1932).
NOTES
conflict with the spirit of this rule. Allowing plaintiff full recovery
takes away the only value this right has to the defandant, that of 'saving
him money.
(c) The aim of giving the plaintiff damages in contract cases is to
put him in as good a position as he would have been had the contract
been performed-labeled "compensatory" damages.29 In no case will
more than mere compensation be given, and Nebraska cases contain
particularly strong language to this effect.30 But in these correspond-
ence school cases, recovery by the plaintiff of the full contract price
will amount to more than mere compensation in virtually every case,
since it is admitted that there will be some savings to the plaintiff, even
though the amount of the savings is in dispute.
In the light of the conflict between the "Nebraska rule" and .the
general rules of contract law set out above, the position of the rule-on
the opposite side of the fence from the normal burden of proof rule on
elements of damage-would not seem to be justified. In addition, there
are considerations of policy which further question the favoritism
shown correspondence schools under the "Nebraska rule." Even a brief
consideration of the circumstances under which a correspondence school
contract is signed illustrates the bargaining inequality of the parties.
There is no bargaining as to terms, the contract being made up by the
school and sent to the student who signs with no chance to alter the
terms. Also, although the law may assume the contrary, it would seem
that persons who contract to pay for these courses would seldom under-
stand the consequences of their act.31 Rarely will the student know the
law governing the interpretation and enforcement of his contract, but
most certainly the school will know 3
2
While attention has been focused on the hardships to the defendant-
student in the cases, the plight of the correspondence school which
"Bates v. Diamond Salt Co., 36 Neb. 900, 55 N.W. 258 (1893); Phillips v.
McKaig, 36 Neb. 853, 55 N.W. 259 (1893); Refrigeration & Air Conditioning Inst.
v. Rine, 80 Ohio App. 317, 75 N.E.2d 473 (1946); McCormick, Damages § 137
(1935).
"Bates v. Diamond Salt Co., 36 Neb. 900, 55 N.W. 258 (1893); Phillips v.
McKaig, 36 Neb. 853, 55 N.W. 259 (1893).
11 A cursory study of correspondence school advertisements will disclose that
many of them are directed at persons without even a high school education.
" There is a general public policy, recognized by the courts, favoring the one
party to a contract who had nothing to do with drafting its terms. An ex-
ample of this feeling on the part of the courts is evidenced by the rule that
where there is doubt as to which of two possible and reasonable meanings
should be adopted, the court will choose the one which is less favorable in its
legal effect to the party who chose the terms of the contract. See Northern
Pacific R.R. v. Twohy Bros. Co., 95 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1938); Lyman-Richey
Sand & Gravel Co. v. State, 123 Neb. 674, 243 N.W. 891 (1932); Restatement,
Contracts § 236(d) (1932). This rule has been described as one "... of public
policy, generally favoring the under dog." 3 Corbin, Contracts § 559, p. 155
(1951).
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must sue if it is to collect on its contract should not be forgotten. The
fact remains that under the "Michigan rule," damages are extremely
difficult for the school to prove, as well as the student. A suggestion
that the school should bear this burden of proof, though backed by all
of the principles heretofore set out, is not fully justified without a con-
sideration of the practical consequences of such a suggestion. It may
be that the recovery to the school would not justify the school's litiga-
tion expenses, so that recovery, as a practical matter, would be barred
by placing the burden of proof on the school, as does the "Michigan
rule." Although no figures are available as to the number of these con-
tracts breached,3 3 the number could conceivably be high. And where a
school brings action on the same contract a number of times, methods
and means of proof could probably be worked out that would greatly
simplify the problem of litigation and possibly lower litigation expenses
to the extent that the school will profit by following a policy of suing
on the contracts. 4
However, even if the correspondence school cannot, under the
"Michigan rule," sue on its contracts and recover enough to pay costs
of litigation, it is submitted that the "Nebraska rule" is not thereby
justified. First, the contract will normally call for a down payment to
be made by the student before the course starts, plus the making of
periodic payments.3 5 The amount represented by these payments may
well cover the costs on this contract as well as a portion of the ex-
pected profits.8 6 And the materials and labor thus saved on one con-
tract may be directed to another profit making contract.3 7 Second,
the law has long provided a remedy for persons entering a contract in
which damages will be difficult to prove-a liquidated damages clause.3 8
A valid liquidated damages clause, i.e., one that does not amount to a
No business organization contacted was able to suggest where such in-
formation might be found.
, An example of only one of the things which a school might do is to pro-
vide in its contracts that the law of its own state will govern interpretation and
enforcement of the contract. Thus the problem of proving damages under the
laws of different jurisdictions need not be met. But cf. notes 31 and 32 supra,
1 In none of the cases found concerning correspondence school contracts did
the facts show that a different method of payment was employed.
"A further policy consideration favoring a change in the rule followed in
Nebraska is that the school is in a position to spread the loss on this contract
among its other contracts. If the school knew that it would not be able to col-
lect fully on contracts which were breached, it could take this into consideration
when establishing the prices for its courses.
17 Correspondence school, contracts are analagous to contracts to sell goods
to the extent that the materials and labor not exepnded on the breached con-
tract may still make a profit for the seller-the correspondence school-when
diverted to use in another contract. Actually, therefore, the proportion of the
profit on the, breached contract represented by the amount of unused materials
and labor is not lost to the school.
-"3 For a history of the law of liquidated damages, see McCormick, Damages§ 147 (1935).
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penalty, will obviously call for payment of an amount less than the
contract price and will thus be more fair to the student than is the
"Nebraska rule." Thus, since the formation-of the terms of the con-
tract are entirely within the control of the school, its remedy, were it
to have the burden of proving the elements constituting its damages,
is in its own hands.
Doiu E. DAVIS, '54
